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I. Description of Egypt's Trade Commitments 
1.1 World Trade Organization 
Egypt, a contracting signatory of the GATT since 1970, has remained an active member 
where it has always led the developing countries, together with India and Brazil, in their 
demands. Egypt joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995 and has adhered 
to all its agreements, with the exception of one of the plurilateral agreements (government 
procurement). Egypt has stressed that it faces problems in implementing a number of the 
WTO agreements, particularly Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights Agreement 
(TRIPS), Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement (TBT), and Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Agreement (SPS). Moreover, the abolishment of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing 
(ATC) is expected to put Egypt in a disadvantaged position vis-a-vis stronger competitors 
such as India, Pakistan, and China, as the existence of quotas has shielded Egypt from 
competition with such countries. 
In the field of services within the context of the General Agreement of Trade in Services 
(GATS), Egypt has made commitments in 5 out of 12 main GATS sectors. The exact 
number of sectors and sub-sectors where Egypt has undertaken commitments reached 
45 out of 160 sectors (WTO Country Profile, 2005a). It has undertaken commitments in 
the fields of construction and engineering related services, financial services, tourism and 
travel related services, maritime transport; and in 2002 it has undertaken several liberal 
commitments in the telecommunications sector to be implemented by the end of 2005. 
Egypt has maintained horizontal commitments putting constraints on the acquisition of 
land and hiring of foreign workers; and following the GATS schedule, it has kept up to its 
commitments. Finally, in 2004, Egypt has joined the Information Technology Agreement. 
Egypt has also enforced its commitments under the Trade Related Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS) agreement, although there are on-going debates regarding violations in the 
area of pharmaceuticals as claimed by the United States of America (US). In 2002 Egypt 
has enacted a new comprehensive intellectual property rights (IPR) law that is in line with 
TRIPS rules and regulations. 
1.2 Great Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA) 
The Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA) refers to the declaration made by the Heads 
of Arab States, in the Cairo 1996 Arab Summit, adopting the executive program of the 
1981 Agreement on the Facilitation and Development of Trade to reach a free trade area 
with zero-percent tariff rates in the year 2007. The Economic and Social Council (ESC) 
of the Arab League approved the executive program in 1997. Initially, it was planned to 
reduce the tariffs by 10% on a yearly basis to reach a free trade area in 10 years (ending 
in 31/12/2007); however, a decision by the ESC in 2001 (based on the recommendation 
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of the Arab Summit in Amman 2001) has accelerated the implementation period to reach 
zero-percent tariffs on 01 /01 /2005. 
Egypt was among the fourteen3 countries out of the 22 Arab States that have joined the 
GAFTA. GAFTA covers all industrial goods. However, members were allowed to draw 
up a list of exceptions (negative list for a specified period of a maximum of 3 years) 
following Article 15 of the GAFTA4 In 1998 the total number of listed goods for exemption 
reached 832 commodities out of a total of 6000 commodities (representing 14% out of 
the total)This number can may be overestimated as there might be common goods in 
the lists of different countries5. Six Arab states (Egypt, Syria, Tunisia, Lebanon, Morocco, 
and Jordan) submitted lists of exempted goods. In the year 2000, a decision was taken 
by the ESC to eliminate those exceptions by September 2002 after an extension from 
February 2001. In 2003, five member countries submitted notifications of the elimination 
of those negative lists. Egypt submitted its notification in October 2003; however it tied 
the elimination of the negative list to finalizing the Protocol on Detailed Rules of Origin 
of the GAFTA. In fact, such condition implies that Egypt did not yet remove its negative 
list, since the agreement on detailed rules of origin is still lagging behind. The argument 
provided by the Egyptian Government was the need to ensure protection of strategic 
industries (e.g. textiles and automobiles) against non-Arab production, which cannot be 
properly implemented without putting in place a detailed system of rules of origin. Hence, 
Egypt can still keep its applied tariff rates on the imports of those goods without granting 
the agreed reductions. It is worth mentioning that several members (e.g. Jordan and some 
Gulf States) have threatened to reciprocate against the treatment of selected Egyptian 
exports due to this unilateral action, especially that the ESC decision on the elimination 
of exemptions did not relate its implementation to reaching a conclusion on detailed rules 
of origin. 
As for agricultural goods, Egypt, as well as other members, was allowed to draw a list 
of exceptions (Roznama) that should be eliminated after a certain date which was set at 
the beginning in 2007 and then accelerated to 2005 to be in line with the full entry into 
force of the agreement. Hence, GAFTA covers all agricultural goods. Egypt was among 
the countries that had a number of agricultural goods exempted and such list was liberalized 
in due time. 
GAFTA does not cover trade in services; however a separate framework agreement for 
regional liberalization of trade in services was concluded in 2003. The services agreement 
3 United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, Morocco, Sudan, Oman, Qatar, Lebanon , Iraq, Bahrain, and 
Libya. 
4 The exceptions follow certain conditions including: I) The commodity should be produced by the country asking for exception and 
should have a similar product produced in one of the other member states; 2) The exception is granted for a specific period not 
exceeding 4 years; 3) The total percentage of exempted products should not exceed 15% of the total exports of the concerned 
country to other members; and 4) Asking for a counter exemption by the country negatively affected from the exemption asked by 
one of the members. 
5 This number may be overestimated as there might be common goods in the lists of different countries. 
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was designed on the basis of being GATS+. Egypt has adhered to this agreement and 
submitted offers in the same sectors, which were deeper than its commitments under 
the GATS. 
The executive program of GAFTA calls for the application of international rules regarding 
subsidies, countervailing measures, safeguards, and anti-dumping measures. However the 
program does not explicitly refer to the WTO agreements. 
To benefit from the preferential treatment that the GAFTA provides, a good should meet 
the rules of origin determined in the Agreement on the Facilitation and Development of 
Trade. The general rules of origin indicate that the value added within the boundaries of 
one or more member states should be no less than 40% of the final ex-factory price of 
the goods; and this percentage is lowered to 20% in case of joint Arab production. The 
40% value added rule is a general and temporary rule till detailed rules of origin are agreed 
upon. The executive program explicitly instructs member states to reach a detailed 
protocol on the rules of origin for manufactured products. 
Drawback is prohibited as non-originating materials used in the manufacture of products 
originating in the Arab member states shall not be subject to drawback or exemption 
from customs duties in any of the Arab member states. 
GAFTA and Arab Bilateral Agreements 
Egypt has concluded a number of bilateral preferential trade agreements with a number 
of Arab countries. Each agreement has its own product coverage and list of exemptions. 
This is a major issue that the ESC has been trying to handle as the relationship between 
the GAFTA and such bilateral agreements is not clear and causes a number of disputes. 
For example, the agricultural products group (Roznama) that was agreed upon under the 
auspices of the GAFTA was not completely in line with the negative list adopted in some 
bilateral agreements. 
Egypt in many cases applies the rules of the GAFTA or the bilateral agreement according 
to its own discretion, which reflects protectionist attitudes and non-transparency. In many 
cases, Egyptian authorities undertake such actions to retaliate against problems faced by 
Egyptian exporters. Interviews with Egyptian government officials in the Egyptian Customs 
Authority emphasized that they face no problems in applying GAFTA in parallel with 
bilateral trade agreements with Arab countries, where exporters from Arab countries 
have the right to choose whether to be treated according to GAFTA rules or to bilateral 
agreements' rules. In fact some officials pinpointed that it is better to apply bilateral rules 
rather than GAFTA rules as there is some sort of dispute settlement mechanism under 
such agreements, unlike under the GAFTA. 
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The bilateral agreements concluded between Egypt and a number of Arab countries 
include: Libya (1990), Syria (1990), Tunisia (1998), Morocco (1998), Lebanon (1998), 
Jordan (1998), and Iraq (2001). Annex I provides further details on the transitional period 
and dates of implementation of such agreements. 
It is worth noting that such agreements were preferential and never reached the status 
of being full free trade areas. They did not include services and included several negative 
lists. 
1.3 The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) 
By definition, the COMESA is not merely a free trade area (FTA). It was established in 
1994 as a strengthened successor to the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern 
Africa (PTA) founded in 1981, and had envisaged the establishment of a Common Market 
and a Monetary Union in the future. Presently, the Common Market includes the following 
19 Members: Egypt, Angola, Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, Democratic R. Congo, Eritrea, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe, 
Mauritius, Comoros, and Djibouti (Tanzania and Namibia withdrew in 2000 and 2003 
respectively). COMESA has not been notified to the WTO under the Enabling Clause 
(WTO, 2005b). 
A Preferential Trade Area (PTA) was initially established with lower tariffs applied to intra- 
regional trade originating in member countries than to extra-regional trade. The granting 
of preferential treatment in the form of reduced tariffs to intra-regional trade commenced 
on July 1, 1984 under the PTA framework, and operated up to December 30, 2000. 
Initially, the reduced tariffs to regional originating goods applied to a group of selected 
commodities contained in a common list. The common list was expanded every two years 
by the inclusion of additional commodities. Different levels of tariff reductions were applied 
to the various commodities in the common list according to the commodity groups into 
which they were classified. The PTA categorized the common list products into six groups: 
Food (excluding luxury items), Raw Materials, Intermediate Goods, Manufactured Consumer 
Goods (excluding luxury items), Capital Goods (including transport equipment), and Luxury 
Goods. Table I shows the exact agreed reduction on each commodity group. 
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Table I : Tariff Reductions on Commodity Groups under the PTA 
Commodity Group Product Description Initial Tariff Reduction 
Group I Food (excluding luxury items) 30 % 
Group II Raw Materials: 
Agricultural 50 % 
Non-Agricultural 60 % 
Group III Intermediate Goods 65 % 
Group IV Manufactured Consumer Goods 
(excluding luxury items): 
Durable Consumer Goods 40 % 
Non-durable Consumer Goods 35 % 
Highly Competing Consumer Goods 30 % 
Consumer Goods of Particular 
Economic Importance to Economic 
Development 70 % 
Group V Capital Goods (including transport 
equipment) 70 % 
Group VI Luxury Goods 10% 
Source: COMESA website, wwwcomesa.int 
Once the initial tariff reductions had been effected, a progressive reduction schedule of 
tariffs was applied with a view to eliminating the tariffs by September 30, 1992, the original 
target date for the attainment of a FTA, which was not achieved by this date. Due to the 
concern about loss of government revenue, the target date for the FTA was postponed 
in 1992 to October 31, 2000 by the Heads of States and Governments at their Summit 
held in 1992 where they adopted a new program for the progressive reduction of tariffs 
applied to all commodities. This new tariff reduction program provided for the attainment 
of a FTA on October 3 I , 20006. Since an average reduction of 60% had been achieved 
by the end of 1992, the new adopted tariff reduction was scheduled to be at a rate of 
10% annually to reach zero-tariff rates by the beginning of 2000. Egypt signed the COMESA 
Treaty in 1998. The agreement entered into force in 1999 (with an initial tariff rate 
reduction of 80%). The 100% tariff reduction was achieved on the 31st of October 2000 
after two 10% tariff cuts per annum. The year 2004 was set as a target date to reach a 
customs union, which was not met and another date was determined in 2005 in the 
meeting of African trade ministers for reaching the customs union of 2008. The year 2020 
was set as a target date for achieving a monetary union; however it is doubtful that such 
date will be met. 
Nine countries have achieved a 100% reduction of tariffs on imports from other members. 
These countries are: Mauritius, Madagascar, Zimbabwe, Egypt, Malawi, Sudan, Kenya, 
6 The same decision was undertaken by eight other member states (Djibouti, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Sudan, Zambia, 
and Zimbabwe). See Egypt' sEgypt's Trade Policy Review by the WTO in 2005 
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Djibouti, and Zambia. Other Members apply different levels of reductions on a reciprocal 
basis. For example, Burundi has currently achieved a 60% reduction on tariffs which 
further reached 80% reduction on January 1, 2003 and 100% reduction on January 1, 
2004. 
The COMESA is supposed to cover all products; agricultural and animal products; mineral and 
non-mineral ores; and manufactured goods (see Chapter Six of the Treaty). The Treaty does 
not refer to any possible prior exemptions or the rights of members to include negative 
lists. However, some members apply exemptions to some tariff lines with prior notifications. 
Textiles and yarns are a typical example in the Egyptian case. Gradual removal of the 
exempted tariff lines is constantly taking place where members are annually submitting 
notifications of the removal of exemptions; and several documents and proceedings of 
ministerial meetings include indications of the suspension/extension of exemptions applied 
(e.g. by Sudan, Egypt, and Kenya) to several tariff lines. In general, all Egyptian exports 
enjoy duty free access in the countries of the FTA. There are few exceptions with Sudan, 
Mauritius, and Kenya. Sudan has a negative list applied since 23/5/200 1, which includes 
58 items that are not allowed to be imported from Egypt unless the full amount of tariff 
duties is paid. On 20/7/2003, and based on Egyptian request, Sudan reconsidered the 
negative list where it reduced 30% of tariff for 12 of the 58 items. Kenya has lately 
undertaken safeguard measures on its imports of sugar for 4 years (the duty free quota 
allowed is I I I thousand ton for treated sugar and 89 thousand tons for raw sugar). These 
measures should end by 31/12/2007. Moreover Kenya has prolonged the usage of safeguard 
measures on wheat-male for another year ending on 22/5/2005. 
COMESA does not cover liberalization of trade in services. However, based on Article 164, 
the members agreed to individually adopt, at bilateral or regional levels, the necessary 
measures in order to progressively achieve the free movement of persons, labor and 
services, and to ensure the enjoyment of the right of establishment and residence by their 
citizens within the Common Market. The members agreed to conclude a Protocol on the 
Free Movement of Persons, Labor, Services, Right of Establishment and Right of Residence. 
Moreover, they agreed that the Protocol on the Gradual Relaxation and Eventual Elimination 
of Visa Requirements within the PTA shall remain in force until such time that a Protocol 
on the Free Movement of Persons, Labor, Service, Right of Establishment, and Residence 
enters into force. However, in reality no negotiations on any modalities or legal frameworks 
for the liberalization of trade in services took place to date. 
The general ROO applied in the COMESA is value added resulting from the process of 
production accounting for at least 45%7 of the good to be considered of specific origin. 
Cumulation according to the detailed protocol on Rules of Origin under negotiation may 
7 The ratio was initially 40% until the members agreed to an Egyptian request to raise it to 45% in 2002. Beforehand, Egypt initially 
applied a unilateral and reciprocal rule of 45%, while the rest applied the 40% ratio. 
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only be applied to materials and products which have acquired originating status by an 
application of rules of the agreement. The value added criterion has been reduced from 
45% to 35% in 2000; however Egypt and Uganda still maintain the 45% value added 
criterion. There might be a possibility of changing the rules of origin under the COMESA; 
however this is still not clear (WTO, 2005b)8. 
Members of COMESA agreed that duty drawback is not allowed under the agreement. 
1.4 Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Agreement 
In January 1977, the General Cooperation Agreement (GCA) was signed between Egypt 
and the European Community (EC). Its main objective was to develop the economic, 
technical, and financial cooperation between Egypt and the EC. This was to be achieved 
through the provision of an improved access for the Egyptian exports in the EC market 
accompanied by financial assistance within the context of financial protocols and technical 
assistance. The Egyptian industrial exports (excluding sensitive commodities such as textiles 
and fabrics as well as some processed agricultural products) entered duty-free to the EC 
markets; and preferential access for some agricultural commodities was provided. The 
agreement was not reciprocal, and Egypt continued to apply the most favored nations 
(MFN) tariffs to goods of EC origin. A number of additional protocols were signed 
afterwards in order to organize the trade relationship in certain sectors as Coal and Steel 
(which are also considered sensitive commodities) or to lessen the negative effects of the 
accession of Spain and Portugal to the EC on the access of the Egyptian products to these 
markets, especially agricultural products,. 
After 20 years of increasingly intensive bilateral trade and development cooperation 
between the European Union (EU 15) and its 12 Mediterranean Partners, a Conference 
of EU and Mediterranean Foreign Ministers was held in Barcelona (November 27-28, 
1995). In this conference a new framework for the relationship between the EU (15) 
andthe South Mediterranean countries was set up. This new setup was announced under 
the so-called Barcelona Process which marked the start of a new "partnership" phase of 
the relationship, including bilateral and regional cooperation, to reach the largest FTA in 
the world by 2010 (hence, called Barcelona Process or, in general, Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership). 
Concerning the Egyptian case, Article 6 of the additional Protocol that supplemented GCA 
in 1987 has identified that, by the year 1994, the EU and Egypt should evaluate the past 
cooperation undertaken between them within the context of the Agreement and its 
additional protocols. After two rounds of exploratory talks in July and September 1994, 
formal negotiations started in January 1995. Since then, a series of negotiation rounds 
8 According to the WTO (2005b), there exists other ways of determining rules of origin under the COMESA; however, based on the 
interviews with government officials, the value added criterion is the one used. 
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have been held in Brussels and Cairo to draft an Egyptian-European Partnership Agreement 
that is meant to change the philosophy of the relationship from a donor-recipient basis 
to a more reciprocal basis, to deepen the existing level of economic relations and to widen 
the scope of the relations beyond the conventional economic field in order to encompass 
as many areas as the parties find necessary, useful, and possible. The negotiations with 
Egypt were concluded in June 1999; and the Egyptian-European Partnership Agreement 
was signed in June 200 1, where a FTA, after 12 years from entry into force, was foreseen. 
The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Agreement is supposed to cover manufactured goods, 
and energy. 
The Egyptian-European Partnership Agreement includes a number of agricultural, fisheries, 
and processed agricultural products that are either subject to tariff quota (in case of agricultural 
goods and fisheries) or other terms of restricted or delayed liberalization (processed agricultural 
goods). Such terms differ from one product to the other, and the Association Council (the 
council responsible for overseeing and monitoring the implementation of the agreement) 
has the right to change the terms when required. 
The Agreement does not cover liberalization of trade in services besides what has been concluded 
under the GATS. However, the parties will consider extending the scope of the agreement 
to include the right to establishment of companies of one party in the territory of another 
party, and the liberalization of the supply of services by companies of one party to service 
consumers in another party. In 2005, initial talks between Egypt and the European 
Commission have started to extend the liberalization of services more than the GATS 
commitments; however no implementation has yet taken place. 
Starting 1/1/2004, a complete dismantling of customs duties and other charges having 
equivalent effect on Egyptian industrial products was supposed to occur without any 
quantitative restrictions in the EU which has been taking place according to the 1977 GCA 
Agreement, with the exception of textiles and ready-made garments where two products 
had to follow a certain quota that was never binding. On the Egyptian side, a 25% customs 
duties reduction each year (on European raw materials and industrial equipment) was 
planned for the period from 1/ 1/2004 to 1/ 1/2007. From 1/ 1/2007 to 1/ 1/2013, a 10% 
customs duties reduction in the first year and 15% customs duties reduction in each 
successive year (on European industrial supplies, semi-manufactured goods and construction 
materials) are to take place. From 1/ 1/2009 to 1/ 1/2016, a 5% customs duties reduction 
in the first and second year and 15% customs duties reduction each successive year (on 
European clothes, electrical domestic appliances, cosmetics, furniture and motor vehicles 
for the transport of goods) are expected according to the time plan. Finally, from I / 1/20 10 
to I / 1/2019, European motor vehicles designed for the transport of persons are supposed 
to be subject to a 10% customs duties reduction each year (see Table 2). 
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Table 2: The most important dates in the Euro-Med Partnership Agreement 
Date Event 
January 1995 Formal negotiations with Egypt 
27th to 28th of November 1995 Barcelona Process, marking the start of a new 
'partnership' phase in the relationship between the EU 
and the Mediterranean countries, including bilateral and 
regional cooperation. 
June 1999 Negotiations with Egypt concluded. 
2010 Planned year for FTA 
Starting from 1/ 1/2004 -A complete dismantling of EU customs duties and other 
charges having equivalent effect on Egyptian industrial 
products. 
-No quantitative restrictions. 
From I / 1/2004 to 1/ 1/2007 25% customs duties reduction each year (European raw 
materials and industrial equipment). 
From 1/ 1/2007 to 1/ 1/2013 10% customs duties reduction first year and 15% 
customs duties reduction each successive year (European 
industrial supplies, semi-manufactured goods, and 
construction materials). 
From 1/ 1/2009 to I / 1/2016 5% customs duties reduction first and second year and 
15% customs duties reduction each successive year 
(European clothes, electrical domestic appliances, 
cosmetics, furniture and motor vehicles for the transport 
of goods). 
From 1/ 1 /2010 to 1/ 1/2019 10% customs duties reduction each year (European 
motor vehicles designed for the transport of persons). 
Source: Ministry of Economy and Foreign Trade (2002), Provisions of the Egyptian-European Partnership Agreement. Cairo: MOEFT 
ROOs under the agreement are relatively complicated and follow a mixture of value 
added, change of tariff heading, and specific production processes. Bilateral cumulation 
is allowed as well as diagonal cumulation with South Mediterranean countries (Algeria, 
Cyprus, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey or the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip) as long as they follow the same system of rules of origin and conclude a 
FTA between them. 
Drawback and exemption from customs duties are prohibited for non-originating materials 
under the agreement; however an exception of 6 years since entry into force of the 
agreement allows Egypt to apply the duty drawback system when exporting to the EU. 
I.5 Aghadir Agreement 
The Barcelona process, which started in 1995, had the objective of strengthening relations 
between the 15 EU members and the 12 South Mediterranean countries. To make the 
Barcelona Process attainable, there was a need to intensify "South-South" co-operation 
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between Mediterranean partners themselves starting, where appropriate, on a sub regional 
basis. The main aim behind Aghadir was to allow for cumulation of rules of origin which 
should enable the South Mediterranean countries to have a better market access in the 
EU and to stimulate exchange between them. Each partner's willingness to build good 
relationships with its neighbors is an important determinant of its readiness to move closer 
to the goal of close cooperation and integration with the EU. Consequently, in May 200 1, 
an initiative was launched between four Arab Mediterranean countries that are part of 
the Euro-Med Partnership Agreement. The initiative ended with signing the Aghadir 
Agreement. In the 4th Euro-Med Conference of Foreign Ministers (Marseilles, November 
15-16, 2000), the Ministers welcomed the desire already expressed by four countries, 
Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, and Jordan, to establish a FTA amongst themselves. Finally the 
initiative was taken at Aghadir/Morocco in the Foreign Ministers meeting on May 8, 2001. 
Negotiations of the Aghadir agreement, also called Med-Arab Free Trade Area (MAFTA), 
were concluded in January 2003, and the agreement was signed on February 25, 2004 in 
accordance with the provisions of the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT) for 
the year 1994 and the other agreements attached to the WTO. Besides the 4 signatory 
countries, the initiative is open to other Arab countries wishing to join. Syria, Lebanon, 
and Algeria are expected to join the Aghadir declaration agreement after meeting all the 
necessary conditions and requirements. 
Aghadir covers industrial products where, by the date of entry into force of the agreement, 
there will be a complete exemption of the list of items subject to prompt and quick 
dismantling with the European Union while the immediate exemptions provided by 
bilateral agreement will remain in force. As for other industrial items subject to non- 
immediate dismantled customs duties, January 1, 2006 shall mark the end of the transitional 
period. Following are the deadlines for the phased-reductions: 
In 2003 the agreement should have entered into force, and customs duties should have 
decreased by 65%, then 80% by I / 1/2004, 90% by I / 1/2005, and 100% tariff reduction 
by 1/ 1/2006. 
Aghadir follows GAFTA in terms of agricultural liberalization. Agricultural and processed 
agricultural products shall be liberalized in accordance with the executive program of the 
Agreement on "Facilitation and Promotion of Trade Exchange among the Arab Countries", 
in preparation for the creation of a GAFTA. 
Aghadir does not liberalize trade in services beyond GATS commitments. Members shall 
implement their obligations, as stated in the WTO's specific schedules of the GATS in 
regard to liberalizing trade in services, and shall endeavor to expand the scope of this 
trade in accordance with the rules and regulations in force. The Ministerial Committee 
shall periodically examine any developments in the services trade among members after 
the entry into force of this agreement. 
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The rules of origin in the Aghadir agreement follow the so-called Pan European rules of 
origin where the main intention behind it is to allow for bilateral and diagonal cumulation 
among Aghadir members to enter the EU market duty free as a means to strengthen 
"South-South" integration. The Pan European rules of origin are highly similar to those 
adopted by the Euro-Med Partnership Agreement. 
Duty drawback is not allowed under Aghadir agreement. 
2. State of Implementation and "Behind the Border" 
Effects 
2.1. State of Implementation of each RTA and of WTO 
WTO 
In terms of commitments under the WTO, Egypt has fulfilled the majority of its commitments. 
The total tariff binding coverage percentage reached 98.8% (WTO country profile, 
2005).The average bound rates for all goods is currently 37.2% down from 45% in 1998; 
whereas the average applied MFN rate in 2004 was 20% down from 26% in 1998 (for 
agricultural goods the bound rate is 95.3%, whereas the applied rate is 22.8%; and for 
non-agricultural goods the bound rate is 28.3% and the applied rate is 19.4%). The Trade 
Policy Review for Egypt in 1999 identified that Egypt has not respected its bound tariff 
rates in the non- agricultural goods. This was confirmed by the Trade Policy Review in 
2005 which showed that at least in 19 tariff lines, applied rates were exceeding bound 
rates. Among the most important products belonging to such tariff lines were textiles and 
ready-made garments, which resulted in the US taking Egypt to consultations under the 
WTO, joined by the EU. Under pressure from the US and the EU, the Minister of Finance 
has issued a decree in 2003 stating that if applied rates exceeded bound rates, then bound 
rates will be the rates applied for WTO members. Moreover, in 2004 the Government 
of Egypt has undertaken a major tariff reform which has brought down the applied tariff 
levels below their bound rates. Egypt has three tariff peaks in the fields of passenger cars 
(not buses), tobacco, and alcoholic beverages. In the area of agriculture, Egypt has kept 
up to all its commitments, where 98% (considered among the high percentages in the 
world) of its tariff lines are bound. Egypt has further announced in the Uruguay Round 
that it provides no subsidies in this sector. The situation is slightly different in the area of 
export subsidies. During the Uruguay Round, Egypt had a GDP per capita less than 1000 
US $; and hence, it was allowed to use export subsidies according to Annex 7 of the 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties. After the Uruguay Round was concluded, 
Egypt GDP per capita exceeded the 1000 US $, and it was not clear whether it was 
allowed to provide export subsidies or not. In 2001 the head of the Working Group of 
Non Agricultural Market Access (NAMA) cleared the matter and Egypt was allowed to 
provide export subsidies. 
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As stated above, the US claimed that Egypt's enforcement of IPR is not in line with the 
TRIPS agreement, especially concerning pharmaceuticals. However the issue is still 
debatable and has not been taken to the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. 
In general, Egypt has been characterized by having high effective rates of protection (ERP) 
(see Refaat, 2003; WTO, 2005b). It is unlikely that the latest tariff reduction, implemented 
in 2004, has reduced the ERP substantially, though nominal rates were significantly changed 
(see ECES, 2005). Moreover, Egypt has been characterized by having large differences 
between its bound and applied rates, the so-called "water in the tariff," which has increased 
by the latest tariff reductions of 2004 (Egypt Country Profile, 2004). The tariff reform of 
2004 has brought down the tariff bands from 27 to 6 (MOF, 2005), an issue that is likely 
to increase the transparency of the tariff system in Egypt which has been enhanced by 
abolishing all the surcharges that used to accompany the applied tariff rates. However, 
the WTO Trade Policy Review in 2005 argues that the number of tariff bands have been 
reduced only from 27 to 12 and not to 6 as declared by the Ministry of Finance (WTO, 
2005). 
GAFTA 
The implementation of the tariff reductions has been the most successful element in the 
GAFTA's overall implementation process, especially after most members have already 
eliminated the lists of exceptions. Some Egyptian exporters have complained that some 
Arab countries did not eliminate tariffs by 2005 as scheduled. For example, food products 
still face tariffs in Morocco (ranging from 5% to 10%); whereas in the case of Libya, a 
new surcharge, which does not apply to domestically produced products (consumption 
tax), has been imposed on imported products. Finally, Yemen, although allowed to enjoy 
preferential treatment, discriminates against Egyptian products, compared to imports 
from other GAFTA members, where it imposes on average 25% tariff rate on Egyptian 
products and allows other Arab products to enter its market duty free9 Furthermore, 
there have been many complaints about incidents in which customs authorities did not 
recognize the certificate of origin or its authenticity. 
Regarding services liberalization, a Framework Agreement on the Liberalization of Trade 
in Services has been concluded in 2003. The agreement was designed to be a GATS like 
agreement adopting the same positive list approach and the same progressive liberalization 
concept. The first round of negotiations on the specific commitments was held in September 
2004 in Beirut, where 5 Arab states presented their initial offers (Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, 
Oman, and United Arab Emirates). It was agreed that the initial offers should not go below 
the level of commitments provided in the WTO (for the Arab States that are already 
members of the WTO or negotiating their accession). To meet the WTO rules on Regional 
9 See Al Ahram Newspaper (6/3/2005). 
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Trade Agreements (RTAs) (GATS Article V), the Arab agreement is expected to provide 
for larger sectoral coverage and/or deeper liberalization in the specific commitments 
already submitted under the GATS framework. It may be early to provide any expectations 
about the final outcome of these negotiations, but the active participation of most Arab 
sates indicates that it could be promising. 
The first round of negotiations on the specific commitments was held in September 2004 
in Beirut, and 9 Arab states attended the meetings (Egypt, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, United 
Arab Emirates, Qatar, Tunisia, Morocco, Bahrain, and Oman). The negotiations took place 
on a bilateral basis between each two countries using the offer-request approach. 
Egypt has submitted commitments as initial offers in the sectors where it had already 
undertaken commitments in the GATS. The offers submitted under this agreement were 
GATS+. The sectors included construction, tourism, financial, maritime and 
telecommunications. However, the exact type of offers submitted and negotiated are 
confidential and cannot be released at this stage. 
It should be noted that the lack of information and data represents a major obstacle toward 
the assessment of the actual implementation status. For example, the de facto removal 
of product exceptions is impossible to trace or report upon since the notifications that 
the states submit to the Arab League secretariat may not necessarily be implemented by 
their customs authorities. Hence, relying on these notifications may be misleading. In 
addition, assessment is difficult due to the absence of a clear definition for non-tariff 
barriers (NTBs), resulting in continuous frictions among the members. 
The Egyptian exporters identified several problems with GAFTA members, including the 
problem of customs valuation with Jordan, extra unjustified surcharges in some Saudi 
ports and the tendency to stop importation of onions out of the allowed season, and the 
reluctance of the Libyan customs authorities to import Egyptian products based on the 
fact that they do not meet the required standards. 
The major problem as identified by Egyptian officials is the manipulation of origin of goods 
imported from GAFTA members into Egypt. With the absence of an effective mechanism 
ensuring adherence to the rules of origin (even the general rule), manipulation has been 
increasing, resulting in several trade frictions. 
There have been country specific problems identified by Egyptian exporters or government 
officials. These included the following: 
In the case of Yemen, there is a need for an agency in Yemen that facilitates the movement 
and entry of Egyptian exports; in the case of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the problem 
of authenticating the rules of origin exists; in Dubai, there are problems associated with 
free zones and problems of identifying which imports are imported from free zones and 
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which are not; and in the case of Algeria, there are problems associated with customs 
procedures, non-transparency in banking regulations concerning trade activities, rules of 
origin certificates, and registration of Egyptian pharmaceuticals. Last but not least, the 
trade with Saudi Arabia faces the following obstacles: embargo on potatoes; embargo on 
fresh frozen meet; abuse of SPS measures regarding agricultural products and pesticides; 
dumping of steel; imposing extra surcharges not in line with GAFTA on some products; 
and not keeping in line with tariff reductions according to GAFTA 
With regards to the separate bilateral agreements, the following problems are worth 
mentioning: 
Libya: 
No application of international standards and quality control; 
Import licensing; 
Authentication of rules of origin certificate; 
Refusing some products based on the argument that they are not Egyptian; 
Inspection procedures; and 
Customs procedures. 
Syria: 
Restricting some imports for the public sector; 
Need for different approvals for the Syrian importers; 
Multiplicity of exchange rates; and 
Imposing extra surcharges and tariffs on the goods that should have been liberalized. 
Tunisia: 
Asking for import licenses; 
Imposing extra surcharges; 
Rules of origin authentication; and 
Registration of pharmaceuticals. 
Morocco: 
Administrative obstacles (asking for import licensing). 
Lebanon: 
Abuse of imposing standards; and 
Refusing to import certain agricultural products (because of Daraq fly). 
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Jordan: 
Abuse of SPS measures affecting some agricultural products (Daraq fly) - partially solved; 
Refusal of dried onions without providing reasons; and 
Imposing additional surcharges on all Jordanian imports from macaroni and some home 
(toilet stuff) appliances. 
Sudan: 
Banking procedures; 
Customs valuation and customs procedures; and 
Transport problems. 
COMESA 
In the context of the multilateral trading system, COMESA was notified to the WTO 
under the Enabling Clause in May 1995. As such, it did not have to undergo an examination 
under Article XXIV, GATT 1994. This implies that issues of lack of full coverage of trade 
and transitional period not exceeding 10 years do not apply in the case of COMESA. 
Generally speaking, the COMESA has managed to reach some remarkable and visible 
achievements. The areas where COMESA has made good progress include the following: 
Removal of tariff barriers; 
Elimination of NTBs particularly the classic ones (quantitative restrictions, licensing, 
import permits, and restrictive foreign exchange controls have been largely eliminated); 
Rules of origin have been simplified, with more scope for import content, by the adoption 
of a 45 percent local value added criterion, with the rules undergoing further changes 
to take into account developments at the WTO and World Customs Organization 
(WCO). 
On the other hand, COMESA suffers from a high degree of non-transparency where the 
Treaty identifies several provisions which are not implemented in reality. Among the most 
important of which, is the absence of any negative lists in the Treaty and their presence 
in reality. For Egyptian authorities, two main problems have been identified according to 
the interviews undertaken with government officials. The first is related to the absence 
of a clear mechanism required to tackle the problems related to trade remedy measures, 
and the second is the manipulation of origin of goods imported from COMESA members. 
Moreover dual membership of COMESA and other overlapping blocks may bring about 
complications in managing regional trade policy. Overlapping of some activities could bring 
about duplication or even inconsistencies (e.g. the case of Sudan and Egypt, both being 
members of GAFTA and COMESA). An exporter from Sudan might prefer to use the 
15 
GAFTA rules rather than COMESA and the same applies for Egyptian exporters to Sudan. 
Agreeing between governments on a negative list under the COMESA implies that 
COMESA supercedes GAFTA, which is not the case as it has never been mentioned in 
any of the agreements that countries have the right to draw their own bilateral arrangements. 
Moreover, such duplication of rules and regulations create an atmosphere of non- 
transparency and vagueness among the different members, such as in the case of the trade 
relationship between Sudan and Egypt. 
Other problems related to implementation include the high degree of non-transparency 
and the lack of information on progress and monitoring of implementation of the common 
market. Finally, COMESA does not include provisions on intellectual property rights or 
provisions on liberalization of trade in services. 
Egyptian-European Partnership Agreement 
Implementation of the agreement started in 2004, which does not allow sufficient time 
to identify any problems in implementation. According to interviews with government 
officials, there are no recorded incidents of problems that faced the implementation of 
the agreement. 
Aghadir 
Despite that year 2005 started, Aghadir has not yet entered into force as some of the 
members did not ratify the agreement. Two countries ratified the agreement in 2004, 
namely Egypt and Tunisia. Morocco ratified the agreement in early 2005, whereas Jordan 
did not. This implies that the schedule of tariffs reduction mentioned above is meaningless, 
especially that GAFTA has surpassed Aghadir; and hence, the zero tariff target among 
Aghadir members was achieved under the GAFTA before Aghadir. 
2.2 Overview of Trade Flows between Egypt and Various Regional Agreements Partners 
Overview of the Trade Flows between Egypt and GAFTA 
The trade between Egypt and GAFTA members increased from US$ 808 million in 1994 
to US$ 1.6 billion in 2003. As a percentage of Egypt's total trade (exports + imports), the 
share of trade with GAFTA members was 6.2 % in 1994, reached a peak of 10.8% in 
2000 then fell to 9.5% in 2003. The trade balance between Egypt and GAFTA witnessed 
a surplus in 1994 of US$ 145 million, which was reversed and the deficit sore to US$ 0.8 
billion in 2000 but was again reversed and Egypt's trade ended in 2003 with a surplus of 
US$ 363 million. 
Hence, Egypt's trade balance with the GAFTA members did not experience a clear trend. 
Following up on the evolution of this balance starting in 1998 (the date of starting tariffs 
reduction within the context of GAFTA), Egypt has experienced a trade deficit that widened 
16 
significantly till 2000 (when 30% of tariffs were cut down) and then the deficit started to 
narrow down till it reached a surplus in 2002 (when 50% of tariffs were cut down) and 
continued to increase in 2003. The main reasons behind such fluctuations were a high 
growth rate for imports till 2000 (reaching an average of more than 25% on annual basis) 
accompanied by a modest increase of exports (average of 6% on annual basis). Starting 
in 2001, the average annual growth of exports soared to reach more than 20%, whereas 
imports recorded a negative growth rate exceeding an annual average of 20%. 
On the exports side (including oil), Egypt increased its exports from US$ 476 million in 
1994 to US$ I billion in 2003 with an average rate of growth of 10%; whereas on the 
imports side, Egypt increased its imports (including oil) from US$ 33 I million to US$ 628 
million with an average yearly growth rate of I I %. The picture does not change significantly 
if oil is excluded, where exports increased from US$ 428 million to US$ 819 million and 
imports from US$ 326 million to US$ 461 million over the period from 1994 to 2003. 
Figure I shows the development of trade between Egypt and GAFTA members over the 
period 1994 to 2003. 
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Overview of Trade Flows between Egypt and COMESA 
Trade between Egypt and COMESA members increased from US$ 118 million in 1994 
to US$ 319 million in 2003. As a percentage of Egypt's total trade, the share of trade with 
COMESA members was I % in 1994 and barely increased to 2% in 2003. The trade 
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deficit between Egypt and COMESA has widened from US$ 50 million in 1994 to reach 
US$ 235 million in 2000 then fell to US$ 59 million in 2003. On the exports side (including 
oil), Egypt increased its exports from US$ 34 million in 1994 to US$ 130 million in 2003 
with an average yearly growth rate of 20%. On the imports side, Egypt increased its 
imports (including oil) from US$ 84 million to US$ 189 million with an average yearly 
growth rate of 13%. The picture does not change significantly if oil is excluded where 
exports increased from US$ 33 million to US$ 129 million while there was no change for 
imports. Figure 2 shows the development of trade between Egypt and COMESA members 
over the period 1994 to 2003. 
The reasons behind this chronic but varying deficit is mainly the huge increase in imports 
in 1994 that created a high level of imports (mainly arising from tea imports from Kenya), 
while exports growth rate was modest. Since 1994 till 2000, the rates of growth of exports 
and imports fluctuated between positive and negative values, but were relatively low and 
almost equal. This is the main reason why an almost equal deficit was sustained over the 
years since 1995 till 2000. Starting in 2000, there was a huge increase in the growth rates 
of both exports and imports; however, since imports were starting from a higher level, 
the deficit kept widening. In addition, the rate of growth of exports in 2002 declined 
significantly to negative values which explain the peak of the deficit in that year. In 2003, 
the annual growth rate of exports reached an unprecedented rate of 96%, whereas the 
annual rate of growth of imports remained stable, leading to a significant decline in the 
trade deficit. 
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Overview of Trade Flows between Egypt and the EU 
Trade between Egypt and EU 15 increased from US$ 5.4 billion in 1994 to reach a maximum 
of US$ 7.2 billion in 1998 then dropped to US 4.8 billion by 2003. As a percentage of 
Egypt's total trade, the share of trade with EU 15 was 42 % in 1994, and decreased to 
28% in 2003. The trade deficit between Egypt and EU 15 has widened from US$ 2.3 
billion in 1994 to reach US$ 4.8 billion in 1998, and then fell to US$ 782 million in 2003. 
On the exports side (including oil), Egypt increased its exports from US$ 1.5 billion in 
1994 to US$ 2 billion in 2003, with an average growth rate of 7%. On the imports side, 
Egypt decreased its imports (including oil) from US$ 3.8 billion in 1994 to US$ 2.8 billion 
in 2003, with an average annual growth rate of -2%. The picture changes significantly if 
oil is excluded, where exports increased from US$ 954 million in 1994 to US$ I billion 
in 2003; while for imports, there was no significant change. Figure 3 shows the development 
of trade between Egypt and EU 15 over the period 1994 to 2003. 
The deficit in the trade of Egypt with EU (15) has been chronic; however it has experienced 
lower rates in the last years. The introduction of oil exports does not result in altering 
the final situation of trade deficit, but it affects heavily the level of deficit. In fact, oil used 
to represent more than 50% of the value of Egyptian non-oil exports in 1994, which 
increased to about 100% in 2003. Non-oil exports experienced a very modest increase 
of around 46 million US $ where it started from a base of 954 million US $ in 1994 and 
ended up with I billion US $ in 2003. The deficit increased from 1994 onwards and 
reached its peak in 1998 when it started to decline afterwards. The overall picture reveals 
a reduced deficit mainly due to the high average annual growth rate of exports (7%) and 
Figure 3: Egypt's Trade with the EU 








,000 __ ,' _.. 
0 
1994 1995 1996 
- - - -f - - Non-Oil Exports 
1997 1998 
Non-Oil Imports A Total Exports - * Total Imports 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Source: World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) Database, World Bank, 2004. 
19 
the modest decline of imports, which averaged -4% on an annual basis over the period 
1994-2003. 
Overview of Trade between Egypt and Aghadir Countries 
Trade between Egypt and Aghadir countries increased from US$ 83 million in 1994 to 
US$ 249 million in 2003. As a percentage of Egypt's total trade, the share of trade with 
Aghadir countries was 0.6 % in 1994, and barely increased to 1.5% in 2003. The trade 
between Egypt and Aghadir countries witnessed a surplus throughout the period 1994 
to 2003, with the exception of 1999. The surplus widened from US$ 18 million in 1994 
to reach US$ 98 million in 2003. On the exports side (including oil), Egypt increased its 
exports from US$ 57 million in 1994 to US$ 200 million in 2003, with an average annual 
growth rate of 19%. On the imports side, Egypt increased its imports (including oil) from 
US$ 26 million to US$ 50 million with an average annual growth rate of 9%. Non-oil 
exports increased from US$ 44 million to US$ 117 million; while for imports, there was 
no change. Figure 4 shows the development of trade between Egypt and Aghadir countries 
over the period 1994 to 2003. 
The case of Aghadir is the only case where Egypt has enjoyed a constant trade surplus; 
however, this surplus has varied widely over the period investigated. Oil represents a 
major component in Egyptian exports to Aghadir countries; it represented around 20% 
of Egypt's total exports to Aghadir countries in 1994, and increased slightly as a percentage 
of total exports in 2003. The rates of growth of both exports (oil and non-oil) and imports 
have been stable, keeping the surplus largely unchanged; but it tended to widen at the 
beginning of the millennium. 
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2.3 Expected Economic Gains and Losses 
Trade creation and trade diversion effects 
Egypt's simple mean tariff in 2002 was 18.4%, whereas its weighted mean tariff was 
13.4%. The simple mean tariff on primary products was 18.2% and the weighted mean 
tariff was 6.6%. As for manufactured products, the simple mean tariff was 19% and the 
weighted mean tariff was 16.4%. This implies that the ERP is relatively high as confirmed 
by other studies (Refaat, 2003). In 2004, the GOE undertook a tariff reform reducing the 
weighted mean tariff to 9. 10% (MOFI, 2004); however, other sources indicated higher 
levels of applied tariffs even after the reductions undertaken reached 26.8% (VVTO 2005b). 
In general, such tariff reduction is likely to reduce the negative effect of trade diversion. 
However, the ERP is not likely to decrease substantially as the tariff reduction was set in 
a manner that keeps the differences between primary and final products large so as to 
ensure protection for domestic producers. Nevertheless, ECES (2005) shows that there 
was a significant reduction in effective rates of protection (ERP). 
To investigate the effects on trade diversion and trade creation, we estimated the effect 
of the different four agreements. The highest expected effect in absolute terms was likely 
to result from dismantling tariffs with the EU, followed by GAFTA, Aghadir, and then the 
COMESA (see Table 3). In relative terms, where trade diversion is calculated as a percentage 
of the respective regional imports, EU had the lowest share, whereas Aghadir had the 
highest share. The estimates were based on the latest trade data available from the WITS 
database and were calculated at the HS 3 digits level. If we consider the percentage of 
the expected trade diversion value in relation to total imports from different regional 
blocks, the results obtained are expected. Following the literature, trade diversion is likely 
to be lower whenever certain conditions are fulfilled, namely: high volume of trade before 
tariff dismantling and low initial tariff barriers, which should be the same following MFN 
rule. The high volume of trade prevail more in the Egypt-EU case. The highest trade 
diversion as a percentage of imports is in the case of Aghadir, the regional block with the 
lowest volume of trade. 
Table 3: Expected Trade Diversion Value (value in U.S$ thousand dollars) 
Index` 2003 
Percentage of respective 
regional imports 
Estimates of trade diversion potential from Egypt to EU 3,109,332 1.1% 
Estimates of trade diversion potential from Egypt to COMESA 1,098,946 5.8% 
Estimates of trade diversion potential from Egypt to GAFTA 1,397,588 1.5% 
Estimates of trade diversion potential from Egypt to Aghadir 1,105,603 22.3% 
The trade diversion index was calculated according to the following formula: 
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Maximum trade diversion = minimum (NX,;,-NXb;) Where 
NXa;=Xa;-Ma; >0 
NXb;=XbI Mb; <0 
X;; = country i's exports of commodity j 
M;; = country is imports of commodity j 
And i takes the value a or b 
Note: this index assumes that one of the two countries is a net exporter and the other a net importer of 
the product (see Fawzy, 1994) 
As for trade creation, there is no methodology to detect the likelihood of trade creation 
between Egypt and the members of the four RTAs, unless we use a computable general 
equilibrium model. Hence, we follow the statement of the economic theory, namely that 
trade creation is likely to increase whenever tariffs are high and the volume of trade is 
low. Following these guiding indicators, it is likely that trade creation will be larger with 
COMESA, GAFTA, and Aghadir countries than with the EU. However, such evaluation 
is subject to a number of limitations, among which is that intra-regional trade between 
Egypt and GAFTA countries, including Aghadir members, is low due to similarity in export 
profiles and production structures. As pointed out by several studies (e.g. Yeats and Ng, 
2000) there is a lack of complementarity between the Arab countries in their trade 
relations. Given that this is the case, and that trade between Egypt on the one hand and 
GAFTA and Aghadir members on the other is likely to be concentrated in inter-industry 
trade, the likelihood of trade creation is limited. This is in contrast with the case of 
COMESA and the EU, where export profiles and production structures are largely different; 
hence, the potential for trade creation is likely to be higher. However, some studies pointed 
out that the potential for intra-industry trade is higher among Arab countries than it is 
with the EU and that the growth of such type of trade among Arab countries is higher 
than between Arab countries and the EU (see for example, Havrylyshyn and Kunzel, 
1997). 
In conclusion, it is extremely difficult to anticipate the effect of Egypt's engagement in the 
different RTAs on trade creation and trade diversion. Following basic economic theory, 
trade creation and trade diversion are likely to be low with the EU when compared to 
the other three RTAs; however, such conclusion is subject to a large number of limitations. 
Among such limitations are the nature of export profiles and production structures and 
the nature of the measure used to calculate the anticipated impact of trade diversion, 
which is highly affected by the number of products traded (i.e. the level of HS or SITC 
classification used). 
Intra-Industry and Export Similarity 
We calculated the Intra-Industry Trade (IIT) index at a 3 digit HS level for Egypt with the 
four RTAs as shown in Table 4. The IIT is highest with GAFTA, followed by Aghadir, EU, 
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and COMESA. The relatively high IIT with GAFTA indicates positive potential for regional 
integration. In general and not only in the case of Egypt, when comparing GAFTA with 
the EU, other studies have reached the same results. Havrylyshyn and Kunzel (1997) 
found that Arab countries have a low IIT, implying a modest industrial base; and the levels 
of IIT calculated for the Arab countries are less than IIT found in NAFTA, APEC and 
Mercosur. Their results and findings showed, however, that the Arab countries are 
experiencing higher growth rates of IIT and have lower IIT levels in their trade relations 
with the EU when compared with IIT levels among themselves. They concluded that Arab 
countries can increase their [IT levels by specializing in the existing industries. 
Table 4: Intra-Industry Trade between Egypt and Selected Regions 
Aghadir COMESA GAFTA EU 
2003 14.0 2.9 28.8 12.4 
Calculated at 3-digit HS 
Source: Authors' Calculations based on WITS database. 
We complement our analysis by investigating the deviation between the Egyptian exports 
and that of members of the four RTAs (for the methodology see Hoekman, 1995). The 
results are revealed in Table 5. As seen from the table, the highest deviation appears to 
be with the EU, which is an expected result due to the different nature of Egyptian exports 
when compared with those of the EU. The deviation is less in the case of GAFTA and 
Aghadir; though, over time, it has increased for GAFTA and decreased for Aghadir. In the 
case of COMESA the indicator showed a decrease over time and the lowest value in 
absolute terms when compared to the others. The decrease in deviation with COMESA 
exports is an unexpected result. 
Table 5: Percentage Deviation of the Structure of the Egyptian Exports from the 
Structure of GAFTA, EU, COMESA, and Aghadir Agreement Member Countries Exports 
GAFTA EU COMESA Aghadir Agreement 
Members 
1995 2001 1995 2001 1995 2001 1995 2001 
Deviation* 
(Percentage) 41.1 39.6 53.0 56.0 37.9 21.2 28.9 35.1 
Source: Authors' Calculations based on UNCTAD, Handbook of Statistics, 2003 
The results of the deviation index calculated in Table 5 do not contradict with the IIT 
results revealed in Table 4. Table 5 shows that the overall export structure of Egypt is 
highly different from the EU, and is comparable with those of the other three RTAs, 
particularly COMESA, which is highly unexpected. Figure 5 provides an overview of the 
structure of Egyptian exports and its development over time. The indicator would have 
shown positive signals if the deviation had decreased over time with the EU, and increased 
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with COMESA, implying that Egypt is moving towards exporting more sophisticated 
products. In fact, it has increased with the EU, and decreased with COMESA, indicating 
that Egypt has moved towards closer exports profile to COMESA and has not caught up 
with the exports profile of the EU. The IIT index refers to trade in the same product 
category that is likely to be low in the case of the EU, which is mainly engaged with Egypt 
in inter-industry trade. The results are confirmed by calculating the export similarity index 
for Egypt with the four RTAs as shown in Table 6. This supports our interpretation of the 
relatively high similarity with GAFTA, Aghadir, and COMESA members and lower similarity 
with EU. Yet, there are differences between the two indices as a result of the different 
years used for calculation as well as the nature of the index methodology. 
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Source: Author's Calculations baed on World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS), World Bank, 2005 
Table 6: Egypt Export Similarity Index Matrix with different Regional Groupings, (2003) 
Country Egypt Aghadir COMESA ESCWA GAFTA EU 
Egypt 100 
Aghadir 38.8 100 
COMESA 35.5 26.4 100 
GAFTA 38.4 19.1 58.7 92.7 100 
EU 29.8 27.4 17.7 17.4 19.8 100 
Calculated at 3-digit HS 
Source: Authors' Calculations based on WITS database 
Egypt's Export Structure 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2001 2002 1990 r r 2000 
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Sensitive Products 
There are several sensitive products for Egypt. Leading examples are passenger cars, 
tobacco, and alcoholic beverages where tariff rates on such products have been historically 
high. Only in 2004, when the Government of Egypt decided to reduce its overall tariff 
rate, it lowered the tariff on a certain category of passenger cars. Passenger cars weighted 
tariff rates were lowered from 84% to 63%; whereas tobacco and alcoholic beverages 
did not enjoy any reductions. In the case of passenger cars, only those with less than 1600 
cc were subject to tariff reduction; whereas cars with more than 1600 cc did not have 
any reductions. Meanwhile, the car components experienced tariff reductions, resulting 
in further increases of their already high ERP. 
In the case of GAFTA, steel remains to be a sensitive product with Saudi Arabia due to 
the subsidization undertaken by the Saudi government. In some years when there is 
oversupply of cotton, cotton represents a sensitive product especially with Syria. 
In the case of COMESA, the Kenyan tea represents the most problematic product and 
is responsible for a large portion of the Egyptian trade deficit with COMESA. On the other 
hand, Egyptian sugar has been a sensitive product for Kenya. 
In the case of EU, agricultural products and processed food in general are sensitive products 
as they are highly subject to Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) restrictions. Potatoes and 
ground nuts are among the most important Egyptian exports affected by SPS measures 
in the EU market. On the other hand, poultry and meat have always been sensitive 
products on the Egyptian side, and many frictions are happening regarding issues related 
to such products. The US and EU have several times claimed that they face problems in 
exporting those two products to the Egyptian market due to non-transparency regarding 
SPS measures. For example, Egyptian authorities insist that imported beef should have a 
maximum of 7% fat content, but it allows domestic producers to have 10% fat content. 
Here we choose four main sensitive products and examine briefly how they are treated 
under different RTAs: fresh fruits and vegetables, processed food, iron and steel, and 
textiles and ready-made garments. 
Fresh Fruits and Vegetables 
Fresh fruits and vegetables follow the same rules of origin in the four RTAs where they 
have to be wholly obtained to acquire origin. However, the problem that impedes market 
access in the Egyptian-EU Partnership Agreement is the quotas, levy prices, and specific 
seasons which limit market access for Egyptian originated products to the EU market. 
This is not the case with the other three RTAs. Moreover, the EU standards are known 
to be more restrictive than the standards in any of the other RTAs. Hence, the problem 
of market access of fresh fruits and vegetables is not related to rules of origin but rather 
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to standards (mainly SPS rules and regulations) and other quantitative restrictions in the 
EU when compared to the other three RTAs. 
Processed Food 
It is impossible to arrive at a certain conclusion regarding the restrictiveness of rules of 
origin (ROOs) in this regard due to the nature of the ROOs specified under the Egyptian- 
EU Partnership Agreement and Aghadir. Both agreements use a hybrid of specific 
manufacturing process, change of tariff heading, or value added criteria to determine the 
rules of origin. On the other hand, COMESA and GAFTA use across the board value 
added criteria (although under the GAFTA detailed rules of origin are still under negotiation). 
In some cases, it might be easier for an exporter of a specific product to acquire origin 
for his product by undertaking a simple manufacturing process which leads to the change 
of tariff heading needed under the EU Partnership Agreement or Aghadir; whereas it is 
difficult to acquire the rules of origin under the COMESA or GAFTA by reaching the 
required threshold for value added. In other cases, it might be the opposite, where reaching 
the threshold of the value added criteria under COMESA and GAFTA is easier than a 
specific process or change of tariff heading under the EU Partnership Agreement or 
Aghadir. Hence, it is extremely difficult to determine which rules of origin are more 
restrictive. 
The problem with processed food under the Egyptian-EU Partnership Agreement is that 
in many cases there is a tariff quota and extra levies that restrict access of such products 
to the EU market. Moreover, new rules related to traceability are very likely to impede 
access of such products to the EU market when compared to other markets. Standards 
are the main crucial factor likely to affect the access of such products to different markets, 
which, as aforementioned, are treated vaguely under all agreements. 
Iron and Steel 
Under Egyptian-EU Partnership and Aghadir agreements, iron and steel need to be 
manufactured from certain products (specific manufacturing process) to acquire origin; 
whereas under the GAFTA and COMESA they need the 40%, and 45% value added 
criteria. The restrictiveness of rules of origin in this regard depends mainly on the degree 
of vertical integration in the exporting mills and whether they complete the process of 
manufacturing of the required originating inputs or not. Comparing the EU ROOs with 
those of GAFTA and COMESA requires comparing the specific manufacturing process 
with the 40%, and the 45% value added criteria which might differ from one mill to 
another. It is extremely difficult to determine which type of rules of origin is more restrictive 
than the other in this regard. It might be easier for an integrated mill when it exports to 
the EU, but easier for unintegrated mills to export to COMESA or GAFTA. 
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Textiles and Ready-Made Garments 
Textiles and ready-made garments are the most sensitive set of products. Normally they 
have the highest restrictive rules of origin in RTAs worldwide. For the sake of our analysis, 
it is clear that COMESA and GAFTA general rules are less restrictive than the Egyptian- 
EU Partnership and the Aghadir agreements. In the latter two agreements, the rule adopted 
always requires using Egyptian yarn so that Egyptian fabrics acquire origin, and using 
Egyptian manufactured fabrics so that Egyptian ready-made garments acquire origin. This 
system is in the majority of cases more restrictive than the general value added criterion 
of GAFTA and COMESA. However, it is worth noting that the interviews revealed that 
EU is not very strict with monitoring the origin of textiles and ready-made garments 
imported into the EU from Egypt. However, the situation started to change recently 
where it has become more restrictive and the EU has proposed a new system for better 
monitoring the origin of imported products. 
Impact on Public Finance 
Tariff revenue never represented a very large share of current government revenue. Tariff 
revenue collected in 2001/2002 represented 14% of total tax revenues and only 9% of 
total governmental revenues. In 2004/2005 such percentages were reduced to I I% of 
the total tax revenues and 7% of the total governmental revenues (MOF, 2005). The 
collected revenue has been always very close (and actually higher due to the other 
surcharges) to the potential aggregate tariff revenue calculated from tariffs and import 
data. This suggests that imports rarely benefited from tariff preferences when entering 
the Egyptian market till 2004. This situation is likely to change in the near future with the 
entry into force of several RTAs, especially with the EU. 
Previous tariff reductions, at least as a result of the RTAs and not because of unilateral 
liberalization, were not accompanied by a decrease in tariff revenue. In spite of the trade 
liberalization efforts initiated in the 1990s, the share of customs duties in total tax revenue 
has steadily increased from 13% to 15% over the period 1991-1998 and remained around 
14% of total tax revenue in 2001/2002. 
This may be partially explained by the fact that lower tariffs were applied over a larger 
import base. This situation is likely to continue till the last phase of entry into force of the 
Egyptian-EU Partnership Agreement as most of the goods with high tariff peaks are 
postponed to the end of the transitional period as evident from the high ERP enjoyed by 
most of the Egyptian industries. Other RTAs are not likely to affect the tariff revenue due 
to the low share of trade with such countries where imports from GAFTA, COMESA, 
and Aghadir did not exceed 8% of total Egyptian imports in 2003. Moreover this 8% is 
overestimated due to the double counting of the Aghadir countries in GAFTA and Sudan 
in COMESA. This is in contrast with the case of the EU where imports from EU represent 
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a large share of Egyptian total imports. This share reached its minimum in 2005 by 
contributing 25%, down from 40% in 1994. The enlargement of the EU is not likely to 
affect the tariff revenue as imports from newly acceding countries to the EU represent 
only 2% of total Egyptian imports. 
The percentage of taxes on international trade to the government current revenue in 
1990 was 14% and in line with the world average for the low middle income countries, 
where the equivalent percentage was 15%. In 1997, the percentage in Egypt was 12.5% 
which is higher than the average of low middle income countries that stood at 9% in 2001 
(World Bank CD Rom 2003). However, such percentages do not take in consideration 
the recent tariff reductions in 2004. 
In order to estimate the impact of tariff reductions on public finance, we adopt a simple 
methodology whereby we multiply tariff revenue by the share of imports from the four 
regional groups. In the case of EU, whose share of total Egyptian imports was 25.8% in 
2003, the expected tariff revenue loss is 110 million US $. In the case of Aghadir, the 
expected tariff revenue loss is 2 million US $. In the case of COMESA, expected tariff 
revenue loss is 7 million US $. Finally, in the case of GAFTA it is 22 million US $ after 
excluding Aghadir members. 
Winners and Losers 
In general it is extremely difficult to predict which industries are likely to gain and which 
are likely to lose with respect to trade liberalization. Regarding market access, Egypt has 
always suffered from supply constraints rather than demand constraints. Hence, market 
access was never a major constraint except for agricultural and processed food exports 
in the EU. We cannot predict the expected impact of a better market access for agricultural 
goods in the EU, as the matter is subject to other important variables including cost of 
transportation, technical measures, health and environmental considerations, etc. 
Identifying losers and gainers with respect to Egypt being engaged in such RTAs is almost 
an impossible task as it depends on a large number of variables that cannot be captured 
in this study. Among such variables is the level of competitiveness of competing products 
with Egyptian exports in such markets and the use of restrictive measures that are still 
not properly monitored by WTO rules and regulations, such as SPS and TBT measures, 
as well as tariffs which can restrict market access of Egyptian exports to other markets. 
To be able to anticipate losers and gainers, we report the results of Madani and Olarreaga 
(2000) that followed the empirical literature on endogenous tariff formation through 
industry lobbying to identify sectors in which tariffs are above their political optimum, 
which in turn indicates that tariff reductions should not be costly. According to their 
methodology, industries that enjoy high rates of protection (above 25%) and do not export 
are likely to lose due to trade liberalization. This is the case of 28 out of 81 sectors of 
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ISIC 4 digits level. Among such sectors that are considered to be over protected are motor 
vehicles, soft drinks, tobacco, musical instruments, tyres and tubes, electrical appliances, 
and house wares (excluding alcoholic beverages). With the exception of tyres and tubes, 
these over-protected sectors are not involved in export activities; hence, such sectors are 
likely to lose, though the economy as a whole will enjoy efficiency gains due to reallocation 
of resources. Other sectors that are highly protected and hence are likely to lose from 
tariff reductions include bakery products, cocoa, chocolate and sugar confectionery, knitting 
mills, leather products, footwear, wooden and cane containers, soap, cleaning preparations, 
perfumes, pottery, and china kitchenware. However, two of these sectors export a 
significant amount of their domestic production, namely leather and pottery, and hence 
they are not likely to be losers. 
The more under-protected sectors are grain mill products, agricultural machinery and 
equipment, railroad equipment, engines and turbines, and aircrafts. These are all sectors 
in which the applied average tariff is below 10% and therefore should not be affected by 
a tariff reduction that applies to the highest tariffs. In fact, the exporting industries among 
them are likely to gain as they will have better market access in the other regional groupings. 
Other Effects 
The tariff dismantling system adopted in the case of the EU is likely to lead to a temporary 
increase in ERP. This can lead to inefficient re-deployment of economic resources towards 
more protected final industries in the interim years. It may also make liberalization in later 
years more politically difficult for the Egyptian government as some industries become 
accustomed to higher interim rates of effective protection. 
The duty free access into the Egyptian market granted to European exporters will reduce 
the level of "protection" granted to Egyptian producers through high external tariff, as 
competition from European exporters will intensify. In other words, the Egyptian-EU 
Partnership agreement in specific is likely to increase the level of competition in the 
Egyptian local market which can lead to the shut-down of many domestic firms that are 
incapable of withstanding European competition. 
Few studies have anticipated the impact of the Egyptian-EU Partnership Agreement on 
Egypt using computable general equilibrium models (CGEs). Konan and Maskus (1997), 
and Kheir-El-Din et. al., (2001) have reached the same conclusion namely, that the gains 
from this agreement in terms of welfare to the Egyptian economy are likely to be very 
small and not exceeding 0.2% of GDP Such small percentage can increase by undertaking 
a broader liberalization scope comprising more than the EU and extending it to the rest 
of the world, and by implementing deeper liberalization with the EU that is not as shallow 
as the current agreement is. 
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Identification of Technical and Financial Assistance under Various 
RTAs 
The COMESA and the GAFTA do not have any complementary mechanisms for provision 
of technical or financial assistance, unlike the Egyptian- EU Partnership and Aghadir 
Agreements. In the case of the Egyptian-EU Partnership Agreement, the agreement itself 
does not have any specific provisions implying technical or financial assistance. However, 
the EU has replaced the conventional Financial Protocols Scheme with the MEDA schemes 
to make loans and grants available to Egypt. Each Protocol lasted for five years where 
such loans and grants were provided under "flexible" conditions from the EU point of 
view, such as subsidized interest rate, non tying to the purchase of European equipments, 
etc. Over the period 1977-1996, Egypt benefited from projects worth 661 million euros 
in grants from the European Commission and 802 million euros in loans from the European 
Investment Bank. The MEDA schemes replaced the old system of Financial Protocols 
starting the mid 1990s. These schemes were designed in a way to facilitate meeting the 
goals set out in the Barcelona Declaration. 
Under the MEDA scheme the amount of money allocated to the South Mediterranean 
countries was determined for the whole set of countries, without individual allocations 
for each county, as was the system in the Financial Protocols. The criteria set for disbursing 
aid were flexible and vague since the EU considered this as helping the countries in their 
transition process to the market economy, without identifying clearly how this can be 
measured or achieved. For this purpose, the Commission draws up Country Strategy 
Papers in which the situation of each partner country and its development policies are 
assessed. These strategy papers are discussed with the respective government and priority 
areas for the EU action are identified then translated in a three year National Indicative 
Program, agreed upon by the host government. Part of MEDA was intended to finance 
concrete actions in support of the objectives of the Barcelona process; whereas another 
part provides sectoral financial support by the release of funds when certain mutually 
agreed upon targets between the Egyptian and European parties are achieved. Under 
MEDA 1, lasting from 1995 to 1999, Egypt benefited from a total of 686 million euros in 
commitments (representing around 17% of the total aid earmarked by the EU to South 
Mediterranean countries). MEDA II was designed to last between 2000 and 2006. Egypt 
has benefited from 194.5 million euros under MEDA II in commitments over the period 
2000-2003. From 1995 to 2003 the disbursement rate was 42% which, as stated by the 
European Commission, is in line with the average in the region (European Union, 2003, 
Annual Cooperation Report: Egypt published by the delegation of the European Commission 
in Egypt). 
The most notable example of EU aid has been the establishment of the Industry 
Modernization Program (IMP), considered at the time of its approval as the largest aid 
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program the EU has ever initiated outside its territories. The amount allocated for this 
program reached 250 million euros. Other important aid programs included 155 million 
euros allocated for the Social Fund for Development, 100 million euros for the Education 
Enhancement Program, and 100 million euros for the Health Sector Reform Program. 
The Egyptian government as well as the private sector had to pay specific contributions 
to the IMP program based on a cost sharing arrangement. The ultimate aim of the program 
was to upgrade the Egyptian industry to make it ready for the challenges of the Egyptian- 
EU Partnership Agreement when the economy is fully liberalized after full implementation 
of the free trade area. The program was devoted mainly to work on the "software" type 
of assistance and hence, no aid was allocated to buy machinery or equipment. Several 
efforts have been undertaken by the program to harmonize the Egyptian standards with 
the European and international standards and to establish "business resource centers" that 
aim at providing business facilitation services in different industrial clusters. It is too early 
to assess the impact of such program, but it is worth emphasizing that the program has 
faced several difficulties in the implementation phase due to bureaucratic measures on 
both the Egyptian and EU sides, resulting in delayed disbursement of allocated budget. 
Since the project has been scheduled to end in 2006, the EU agreed with the Egyptian 
government in 2004 to scale down the aid allocated to this program and transfer the 
money for budget support. In April 2005, the managing director of the IMP announced 
that 1176 firms have benefited from the IMP services, and benefits ranged from helping 
firms to achieve high level quality products to enhancing their export capabilities and 
upgrading their human capital (Al Ahram Newspaper 24 April, 2005). 
Another series of trade enhancement programs (TEP) have been provided by the EU to 
Egypt in late 2004 to enhance the capacity building of different organizations and affiliates 
of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Industry in trade related aspects (TEPA, TEPB, and 
TEPC). These programs are still ongoing, and it is currently difficult to assess their impact; 
however, several points are worth noting. The mechanism of aid provision entails a lot 
of inefficiencies since aid is channeled through consortium of bidding subcontractors, 
where many experts are brought to the programs without the required experience, 
implying loss of money, and where the subcontractors consume the largest bulk of money 
in administrative matters. It has been estimated that around 60-70% of the aid allocated 
returns back to the EU in terms of experts' fees and overhead costs of European 
subcontractors. 
The Aghadir Agreement does not contain any specific provision for financial or technical 
assistance. However, since it is a joint initiative of both the EU and the four countries, the 
EU allocates some financial and technical aid for this Agreement. There are no clear figures 
on such aid, although not significant 
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The GAFTA and COMESA agreements do not have any financial and technical assistance 
programs. However, COMESA receives financial and technical assistance from other 
countries as the EU, international agencies, the World Bank, and WTO. 
3. Legislative, Regulatory, and Administrative 
Commitments 
In this section we focus on the difference between WTO commitments and the four RTAs 
under study. In other words, to what extent do such RTAs conform with GATT or GATS 
or are, in general, WTO+? We use a sectoral approach where we discuss various issues 
and see how they are managed in different RTAs while using the WTO as our benchmark. 
We complement our analysis by referring to the Egyptian laws, regulations, and organizations 
that have been established to handle such agreements. 
Industrial Products 
The WTO commitments are, by nature, less restrictive since they refer mainly to "bound 
rates"; whereas all the RTAs start from the "applied" rates using a specific year as the 
base year for reduction of tariffs. This implies that the four RTAs are GATT+, however, 
a general theme of all RTAs around the globe. The four RTAs, as reviewed in Section I, 
differ significantly in terms of their transitional periods. The longest is the Egyptian-EU 
Partnership agreement where the transitional period is 12 years, with the exception of 
cars which is 16 years. The GAFTA follows with a I 0-year transitional period that was 
accelerated to 8 years. COMESA has a shorter period for Egypt and was fully implemented 
in 2 years. Aghadir, when implemented, has a short transitional period of 2 years. It should 
be noted that the approach for tariff reduction differs significantly between the Egyptian- 
EU Partnership agreement on the one hand and the other three agreements on the other 
hand. In the case of Egypt-EU Partnership, tariffs on industrial goods are classified into 
three main categories, each lasting for four years. The system of reducing tariffs, as 
indicated in section I.4., shows that the nature of tariff reduction entails increasing ERP 
over the whole period. The other three RTAs adopt a simpler approach of across-the- 
board equal tariff reduction without differentiating between different types of goods. In 
the case of COMESA only, and not stated in the agreement, countries have their negative 
lists, an issue that lacks transparency and is neither available on the website of COMESA 
nor among main government officials. We were able to acquire this kind of information 
through interviews and the "published" negative list of Sudan for goods imported from 
Egypt within the context of COMESA, but we were not able to quire an equivalent list 
for Egypt in other countries or other countries with Egypt. However, we were able to 
find out that some items as textiles and clothing are among the negative list that Egypt 
adopts within the context of COMESA. 
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Agricultural Products 
Agriculture is highly complicated as it entails details that render the analysis of the RTAs, 
while using the WTO as a benchmark, rather difficult. The Agreement on Agriculture uses 
the tariff quota system which is adopted differently in the Egypt-EU Partnership Agreement. 
The tariff quota system under the GATT extends the duty-free access for countries over 
time by widening the duty-free quota. However, in the case of the Egyptian-EU Partnership 
agreement, duty-free quotas are allowed for some commodities, but are not expanded 
over time. In the field of agriculture, Egyptian-EU Partnership agreement is not a WTO+. 
The GAFTA entailed in the transitional period a negative list, "Roznama"; however, it had 
a time limit and was completely abolished by 2005. Hence, GAFTA is a WTO+. The 
Aghadir Agreement is WTO+ since it does not allow any negative lists. COMESA, in 
theory, is WTO+; but in reality, this is difficult to assess since it contains goods that can 
be subject to quotas or extra surcharges or tariffs, as the case of sugar between Egypt 
and Kenya. As mentioned above, the whole COMESA agreement is full of blank boxes 
that we were unable to assess due to lack of transparency and information. 
Services 
Egypt has undertaken commitments in 5 sectors (out of 12), or 45 sub sectors out of the 
160 under the GATS. It has undertaken commitments in the fields of telecommunications, 
tourism, construction, transport, and financial services. The Egyptian-EU-Partnership 
Agreement confined its obligations to GATS; however, it extended it in a vague, flexible 
form for starting negotiations after five years from entry into force of the agreement on 
further liberalization. In 2005 initial talks on extending the liberalization of trade in services 
beyond the GATS started; however, nothing concrete is implemented. The GAFTA did 
not include services; however, following the Framework Agreement on the Liberalization 
of Trade in Services concluded in 2003, the signatories are required to go beyond GATS 
whether in terms of extra sectors or deepening the sectors themselves; thus, it is considered 
GATS+. The COMESA includes a clause for progressive liberalization of trade in services. 
However, it is vague as in the case of Egypt-EU Partnership Agreement, yet better as it 
allows flexibility in terms of adopting the liberalization on either bilateral or collective 
basis10. Hence, it suffices to say that none of the Agreements are GATS+; nevertheless, 
they have the potential to be GATS+. The Aghadir Agreement was the least explicit 
agreement among the four concerning the issue of liberalization of trade in services. 
10 Based on Article 164, the member States agreed to adopt, individually and at bilateral or regional levels, the necessary measures 
in order to achieve progressively the free movement of persons, labor, and services, and to ensure the enjoyment of the right of 
establishment and residence by their citizens within the Common Market. 
33 
Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) 
GAFTA and the COMESA agreements did not go further beyond the TRIPS agreement. 
Aghadir referred explicitly to TRIPS; whereas GAFTA mentioned that consultation over 
IPRs shall take place in the future, without identifying a specific date. COMESA did not 
include any article related to IPRs; whereas Egyptian-EU Partnership asked for adopting 
the highest prevailing international standards regarding IPRs (Article 37). In an annex 
attached to the latter agreement (Annex VI), a list of multilateral agreements dealing with 
IPRs were stated to which Egypt should adhere, implying some kind of TRIPS+ commitments. 
It is worth mentioning that Egypt has issued a comprehensive IPR law that is in line with 
TRIPS requirements. The problem with IPR is the high cost of enforcement and lack of 
human capacity to implement the law efficiently. Egypt has received substantial amount 
of aid, especially from the United States of America, to upgrade its IPR system. 
Standards 
None of the agreements went beyond the WTO requirements. In fact, all the agreements 
call for cooperation in the field of harmonization of standards in the future; and the 
Egyptian-EU Partnership and Aghadir call even for mutual recognition. However, in reality 
all agreements were extremely flexible in their wording without identifying concrete steps 
to be undertaken or specific dates to be followed. 
The Egyptian Organization of Standardization (EOS), in charge of setting Egyptian standards, 
is working on harmonizing these standards with European ones. The problem is the lack 
of enforcement and mixing safety with health measures. This has been evident in several 
incidents, on interpretation of many provisions, between EOS and the Egyptian Ministry 
of Health. Moreover, Egypt lacks an accreditation body that is able to accredit internationally 
recognized standards. There are a number of internationally accredited labs; however, 
they are few and do not handle different fields. 
Rules of Origin 
The issue of rules of origin is irrelevant in this regard since there is no agreement under 
the WTO that deals with preferential rules of origin. Hence, this issue cannot take the 
Egyptian commitments under the WTO as a benchmark. 
The organization in charge of monitoring rules of origin is the General Organization of 
Exports and Imports Control (GOEIC), affiliated to the Ministry of Trade and Industry. 
The problem with GOEIC is that its officials are not used to check on the authentication 
of origin except for the value added criterion. The new provisions related to specific 
manufacturing processes or change of tariff heading, which the Egypt-EU Partnership 
agreement uses, are new to the officials who lack the capability to monitor such new 
methods. Moreover, there is a lack of awareness on rules of origin issues among the 
exporting community. 
34 
Dispute Settlement Systems 
The WTO has a clear dispute settlement mechanism that was strengthened in the Uruguay 
Round. GAFTA does not yet have one; nevertheless, in 2004 the ESC has approved the 
executive decree of a dispute settlement mechanism, but it is still not functioning. The 
executive decree for dispute settlement includes four steps: I) trying to resolve the dispute 
through consulting with the contact points identified by each member; 2) bilateral 
consultations between the two countries in dispute; 3) arbitration; and 4) the Investment 
Court. The executive decree identified the steps and time horizon for resolving the 
disputes. 
The COMESA calls for the establishment of the COMESA Court of Justice (Chapter Five 
of the Treaty) to solve related problems. It was intended to establish COMESA as a rules- 
based institution, with rules that can be enforced through a specialized court called the 
Court of Law. The Court of Law arbitrates on unfair trade practices and ensures that 
Member States uniformly implement and comply with agreed decisions. To date, most 
disputes have been handled through bilateral consultations and discussions of ministerial 
meetings, while very few cases (around three) have been brought forward to the Court. 
No details are available on those disputes, implying non-transparency. 
The Egypt-EU Partnership Agreement has a dispute settlement mechanism, mainly handled 
by the Association Council. However, in all cases it cannot be considered a real dispute 
settlement body as it involves monitoring of the whole agreement. There is nothing 
equivalent to the EU Court of justice or any specialized body confined to handling dispute 
settlements. 
The Aghadir has a clear dispute settlement mechanism that is handled mainly by the 
Ministerial committee. 
Competition Policies and State Aid 
The WTO has recently dropped out the competition in the July Package meeting of 2004. 
Hence, it is not any more on the agenda of the WTO. 
The GAFTA has no specific provision on competition; however it calls for the harmonization 
of common competition policy, although only 4 GAFTA members have competition laws 
(Jordan, Tunisia, Morocco, and Egypt). Beyond the GAFTA, the ESC has recently adopted 
a set of guidelines, in the form of non-binding rules that states should follow while designing 
and introducing their competition laws. The working party on competition policy remains 
operative and is supposed to hold annual meetings to consult on the developments of 
introduction and implementation of competition laws. 
COMESA is among the very active RTAs in terms of having a regional competition policy, 
though still not enacted, several serious steps in this regard have been undertaken by the 
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secretariat, and an expert group has already concluded a Draft COMESA Competition 
Law. The Draft Law is quite comprehensive, with a clear view of the implementation 
methodology and the establishment of a common competition authority. However, with 
the prevailing divergence in legal, political, and economic systems in member states, the 
actual feasibility of implementation remains highly questionable. It is worth mentioning 
that this draft law sets a precedent in the sense that it explicitly states that it will supersede 
national legislations of member states where contradictions exist. 
The Egypt-EU Partnership Agreement has a specific provision on competition. All agreements 
between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings, concerted practices 
between undertakings, and any public aids that have as their object or effect the prevention, 
restriction, or distortion of competition are incompatible with the proper functioning of 
the Agreement. Abuse is handled by the Association Committee. At the time of signing 
the agreement, Egypt did not have a competition law, so the wording of the agreement 
was as follows: "The Parties recognize that Egypt is currently in the process of drafting 
its own competition law. While drafting its law, Egypt will take into account the competition 
rules developed within the European Union. If serious problems arise, the Parties may 
raise the matter for consideration in the Association Council." 
There is no mention of competition issues in the Aghadir Agreement. 
It is worth mentioning that in this regard all RTAs studied, with the exception of Aghadir, 
are WTO+. 
It is also worth mentioning that Egypt has issued its competition law in 2004. In August 
2005, the executive regulations were issued, and the board of directors of the Competition 
Authority was chosen. However, the Authority did not start to function yet, as it is in the 
process of building the necessary human capacity. The issuing of the competition law came 
after a long period of drafting different versions, reaching 18 drafts since 1995. Part of the 
pressure on issuing the law came from the European Union, where one of the provisions 
of the Partnership agreement asks Egypt for having a law and calls for harmonization of 
competition laws and policies. 
Customs Coordination 
There is no customs coordination under the WTO. 
GAFTA calls for harmonization of external tariffs in the context of a customs union; 
however, the committee responsible for customs union never met. 
COMESA did not include any article on customs coordination, although it should have 
reached a customs union by 2004. The procedures and mechanisms for establishing a 
customs union were not included in the agreement itself. 
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The Egyptian-EU Partnership Agreement calls for cooperation in the field of customs 
procedures without identifying any clear steps in this regard. 
Aghadir does not contain any provisions regarding customs coordination. 
Trade Remedies (including safeguards, countervailing measures, and antidumping) 
Antidumping provisions as well as safeguards and countervailing measures in all agreements 
refer to related articles of the GATT. Regarding bilateral agreements with Arab countries, 
we observe that: antidumping measures are absent in the case of the agreement with 
Libya; in the case of Syria, they are to be solved by the joint committee; for Tunisia and 
Morocco, the anti-dumping measures are supposed to follow the WTO rules; in the 
agreement with Lebanon, the dumping measures do not yet exist; in the agreement with 
Jordan, a special article following WTO rules and regulations is to be applied; in the 
agreement with Iraq, a special Article is devoted for that purpose; and finally, the agreement 
with Sudan follows the COMESA rules. 
Until the end of 2001, COMESA did not have proper trade remedy provisions (anti- 
dumping, countervailing, injury to industry, etc.) and members took the liberty to devise 
their own measures to address what they considered to be major market disruptions, 
despite that there are a number of Articles that deal with such issues (Articles 51, 52, 53, 
and 54 of Chapter Six). Thus, for example, when faced with the surge of imports from 
Egypt in a number of products, Mauritius and Kenya had bilateral talks with the Egyptian 
authorities to re-introduce duties on these products. Sudan also applies unilateral exemptions 
of some Egyptian exports. Egypt had bilateral talks with Kenya to stop the surge of Kenyan 
tea imports. Such unilateral measures can be double-edged swords and their abuse can 
frustrate trade. Egypt has been a victim to some of these unilateral measures. Nevertheless, 
many analysts claim that such safeguards, even on an ad hoc basis, helped to have greater 
participation of "smaller" countries in the FTA. 
With respect to Kenya imposing a safeguard measure against sugar by a quantitative 
restriction, some issues need to be mentioned. The restrictions were imposed without 
any investigation made to determine the extent of industry's injury and the causal link 
between imports and the affected industry. To date, the margin of dumping has not been 
established. The case of sugar imports into Kenya can be rightly linked to cases of under 
valuation, under invoicing, or lack of proper controls at our borders. Many reports highlight 
that the export prices compared with the contracted or the normal value have been 
determined or established to enable dumping of sugar imported into the Kenyan market'' 
11 No data on the actual legal investigations are currently accessible.. 
37 
Government Procurement 
The WTO has its own plurilateral agreement regarding government procurement that 
Egypt did not join. The agreement regarding transparency in government procurement 
was dropped from the agenda of the WTO in July 2004. 
The GAFTA has an article that calls for preferential treatment of Arab countries in the 
government procurement projects of the GAFTA members (Article 8 of the GAFTA). 
However, in reality no consultation took place. The EU Partnership Agreement did not 
include government procurement; however, it refers to progressive future liberalization 
in vague terms. COMESA did not include any preferential treatment, but makes sure that 
no discrimination with third countries takes place. Aghadir did not include any provisions 
on preferential liberalization of government procurement. 
Countervailing Measures 
The four agreements follow the WTO rules and regulations in this regard. There might 
be slight differences as in the case of COMESA where its rules are not fully in line with 
WTO rules on subsidies procedures. In the case of WTO countervailing investigations 
shall be terminated immediately in cases where the amount of a subsidy is de minimis (the 
subsidy is less than I per cent ad valorem) or where the volume of subsidized imports, 
actual or potential, or the injury is negligible. The COMESA is more generous in the sense 
of raising the de minimis level to 2% of the product value (ad valorem). However, the 
COMESA did not refer to the exception allowed for countries with less than US $ 1000 
GDP per capita from imposing any countervailing measures as the WTO allows. 
This issue is controversial. The WTO agreement in this regard allows the parties to 
undertake countervailing measures against aid provided. In addition, it restricts public aid. 
However, Egypt following WTO rules is allowed to subsidize exports as it falls under 
Annex 7 of the Agreement on Subsidies concluded in the Uruguay Round. During the 
Round, Egypt had GDP per capita less than $ 1000 which allowed it to subsidize exports 
similar to the less developed countries. Egypt afterwards graduated and passed the 
threshold of $1000 GDP per capita. In the NAMA working group, Egypt raised the issue 
of its ability to subsidize exports and the Chairman of NAMA allowed it. So, it is not clear 
how this issue is to be resolved as there is contradiction between WTO waiver for Egypt 
and all four RTAs. 
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4. Potential Impacts of Various RTAs 
In this section, we focus on the areas of similarities and dissimilarities between the different 
RTAs. 
Product Coverage of Merchandise Trade 
The COMESA has the widest coverage, followed by GAFTA which had negative lists that 
have been abolished in the case of agricultural products, followed by Aghadir. In the case 
of Egyptian-EU Partnership, agricultural, processed agricultural, and fisheries products 
follow certain procedures that in some cases are clearly determined and in others left for 
future negotiations. Problems and areas of conflict can arise in the case of processed 
agricultural goods covered by Aghadir but follow other norms in EU Partnerships. 
Rules of Origin 
There are huge differences in terms of applying rules of origin and their cumulation. In 
the case of EU, the main criterion is value added (60%) in addition to other criteria. There 
is a large similarity between the rules of origin applied in the Egyptian-EU Partnership 
Agreement (EuroMed ROOs) and that of Aghadir (following the Pan European ROOs, 
though not identical). The case of GAFTA is based mainly on the 40% value added as well. 
as that of COMESA (where Egypt is trying to raise it to 45%). There are huge differences 
in details related to cumulation of rules of origin where the four agreements allow for it, 
but with different meanings. For example, Egyptian-EU Partnership allows for bilateral 
and diagonal cumulation, whereas COMESA allows only for diagonal cumulation (which 
is a step more advanced than bilateral). GAFTA is not clear in terms of cumulation and 
its conditions, with the general exception of lowering the value added requirements to 
20% in case of joint Arab products. 
Common Provisions 
Rules covering antidumping and countervailing measures differ substantially among the 
agreements, where the Egyptian-EU Partnership and Aghadir Agreements are the most 
transparent. In case of COMESA and GAFTA, the rules refer to international standards 
(without defining what international standards are). COMESA has some rules that govern 
antidumping; however, the mechanism of applying such rules remains absent. In case of 
GAFTA, the antidumping disputes can be resolved through the dispute settlement 
mechanism initiated by the ESC. 
In the area of safeguards, Egyptian-EU Partnership and Aghadir Agreements follow the 
same norms of WTO; while GAFTA and COMESA follow the decisions of the ESC in case 
of GAFTA and the special council in case of COMESA. The application of different safeguard 
mechanisms is not likely to create serious problems when agreements are implemented. 
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However, in case of GAFTA and COMESA it is not clear how these measures will be 
applied. 
Duty Drawback 
Duty drawback is granted in the transitional period of GAFTA, only for 6 years in Egypt- 
EU Partnership Agreement, eligible for certain products within limits in case of Aghadir 
till 2009, and unclear in case of COMESA. This can result in application problems even 
in the most two harmonized agreements (Egyptian-EU Partnership and Aghadir Agreement); 
where, for example, the end of the 6 years for Egypt since entry into force of the agreement 
is 2009, though in line with what Aghadir sets as a date, the scope of application in Aghadir 
is quite limited. This can result in problems not only confined to the duty drawback but 
also entails other aspects of cumulation of rules of origin. 
Dispute Settlement 
The dispute settlement mechanism is more or less similar in the different RTAs, with the 
exception of COMESA, in theory as stated by the preamble of the agreement but not in 
practice, where the procedures start by trying to resolve the dispute between the two 
parties without recourse to the formal dispute settlement mechanism. If the first step 
fails, then they resort to the procedures of the dispute settlement mechanism designed 
for the purpose of the agreement where, in general, there is a committee responsible for 
resolving the dispute. The committee consists of representatives of the two parties. If for 
any reason the committee fails to resolve the dispute, or if one of the parties does not 
accept the resolution, then they have the right to go for an arbitrator. This is generally 
the last step and both parties have to accept the decisions made by the arbitrator. 
The difference in systems of dispute settlement does not cause a problem in the functioning 
of the different agreements, but it adds to the burden of handling different legal issues 
involving either the government or the private sector. 
Services Liberalization 
There are several problems associated with the liberalization of trade in services. For 
example, in GAFTA this is now being negotiated among its members as a GATS+ type 
of agreement; whereas in Aghadir it is only GATS, although the members of Aghadir are 
the same members of GAFTA. The Egyptian-EU Partnership agreement faces no problems. 
COMESA's case is not clear as it does not follow any guidelines regarding what is meant 
by services though it mentions in one of its articles that it will undertake liberalization of 
trade in services in the future. Moreover, problems will rise in case of countries who are 
members of both COMESA and GAFTA. 
The right of establishment concept is not clearly explained in all of the agreements. 
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Competition Law and Policies 
This is one of the main areas where incompatibility among different agreements exists 
and can create difficulties in implementation of these agreements, as each is expected to 
follow different norms. 
IPRs 
There are large differences between the provisions governing intellectual property rights 
in different agreements. Aghadir abides by WTO, Egyptian-EU Partnership follows the 
prevailing international standards including several multilateral agreements, COMESA 
follows unclear standards, and GAFTA still does not consider any norms. 
Government Procurement 
There are no common themes regarding government procurement among the different 
agreements; however, this is not likely to create problems. 
Standardization and Conformity Assessment 
This is one of the main areas that can create several problems in coordination and 
implementation. All the agreements call for harmonization and mutual recognition. 
However, the terms of implementation and schedule for harmonization and mutual 
recognition schemes are not clear. The Egyptian-EU Partnership and the Aghadir agreement 
call for signing mutual recognition agreements, but in a general way and without identifying 
steps or dates. 
5. Conclusion and Policy Recommendations 
The study identified the differences between the four RTAs under investigation while 
benchmarking them against WTO rules and regulations. It revealed that in some cases 
there is a wide gap between what the agreements' provisions identify and what is 
implemented in reality. The COMESA was a clear example of non-transparency in this 
regard. In other agreements, the time that has elapsed since the full implementation was 
too short to allow for assessing the gap between what the agreements entail and what 
is implemented in reality. 
The overlapping of the agreements does not entail a lot of costs because they are shallow, 
and hence, the deep aspects (as harmonization of rules and regulations) are still not in 
effect, creating less friction and problems arising from overlapping. The issue is just a 
matter of handling the dismantling of tariffs following the schedule of the different 
agreements, which proved not problematic for customs officials. 
The agreements share many similarities as well as differences. However, the interviews 
with officials and exporters identified that till now there are no problems faced due to 
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overlapping. The customs officials asserted that the coexistence of GAFTA and other 
bilateral agreements with Arab countries is not problematic. The main problem related 
to overlapping RTAs, or RTAs in general, as identified by officials, is the proof of origin, 
especially from GAFTA and COMESA members. Based on the interview results, it was 
revealed that the foreign exporter identifies the system by which he wants his exports 
to be treated. 
Domestic exporters do not face large problems related to the overlapping of RTAs for 
two main reasons: I) Three of the agreements did not fully enter into force and the fourth 
is still in its first year of implementation. 2) The majority of exporters deal with one major 
market, and hence, are not affected by the multiplicity of agreements concluded. 
Most of the problems related to standards and their harmonization did not materialize 
because the four agreements were vague when dealing with issues related to harmonization 
and called only for cooperation on this matter. It is worth noting that standards seem to 
be the most restricting factor when such agreements are fully operational. The threat of 
different standards did not materialize because the agreements did not enter completely 
into force. However, as soon as all agreements fully enter into force, it is expected that 
standards will be the main issue hindering market access for Egyptian products in the 
different markets. 
The gains of overlapping of RTAs in terms of cumulation of rules of origin are still not 
used. This is a general theme that is applicable to one RTA without the overlapping effect. 
Exporters are not making use of any cumulation procedure under any agreement. 
The expected trade diversion towards the EU implies that Egyptian tariffs will no longer 
exclusively protect Egyptian producers. This will induce income redistribution from 
government's tariff revenue to European exporters' profits. In order to avoid trade 
diversion, the trade liberalization with Europe should be accompanied by external tariff 
reductions. 
Interviews revealed that the human capacity of the General Organization for Exports and 
Imports Control (GOEIC) in Egypt is limited in proving origin of the imported products. 
One of the important areas to be addressed is the urgent need for capacity building of 
officials in this organization, a body affiliated to the Ministry of Trade and Industry, on 
identification of rules of origin. In an intensive interview with the person in charge of rules 
of origin of the aforementioned organization, he asserted that the officials lack training 
on identifying the rules of origin following the Egyptian-EU Partnership Agreement. 
According to what he mentioned, officials are used to the value added criterion, but are 
not trained on change of tariff heading or specific industrial processes which are used 
extensively in the Egypt-EU Partnership Agreement. 
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Another institutional issue that is urgently needed is training the Egyptian negotiators on 
how to reconcile the negative effects of rules of origin (The Sphagati Bowl following 
Bhagwati) in negotiating ROOs in different RTAs of Egypt. The negative impact of the 
overlapping of rules of origin still did not materialize because most of the agreements did 
not yet fully enter into force. The two agreements that have entered into force, COMESA 
and GAFTA, have already faced several problems in identifying origin. 
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Annex I : List of Bilateral Arab Preferential Trade Agreements 
concluded between Egypt and a number of Arab Countries 
Libya: The agreement was signed in 1990, for a period of 5 years to be renewed 
automatically unless otherwise notified. This agreement entered into force on 18/6/199 1. 
Syria: The agreement was signed in 1990, for a period of one year to be renewed 
automatically unless otherwise notified. This agreement entered into force on 1/ 12/199 1. 
Tunisia: The agreement was signed in 1998 to last for a long period unless otherwise 
notified; however, it is subject for review. This agreement entered into force on 15/3/1999. 
Morocco: The agreement was signed in 1998 to last for a long period unless otherwise 
notified; however, it is subject for review. This agreement entered into force on 28/4/1999 
Lebanon: The agreement was signed in 1998 to last for a long period unless otherwise 
notified. This agreement entered into force on 15/3/1999 
Jordan: The agreement was signed in 1998 to last for a long period unless otherwise 
notified; however, it is subject for review. This agreement entered into force on 21/12/1998. 
Iraq: The agreement was signed in 2001 to last for a long period unless otherwise notified; 
however, it is subject for review. This agreement entered into force on 8/7/2001. 
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